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THE IMPLICATION OF MONITORING AND INCENTIVES ON BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY ADMINISTRATION (FCTA)

Bappayo Masu-Gombe, Ph.D.
Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Abuja
bappayomasugombe@gmail.com

Abdullahi Mohammed Alkali
Department of Finance and Accounts, FCDA, Abuja
alkali.abdullahi@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The study examines the Implication of Monitoring and Incentives on Budget Implementation in Nigeria: a case study of Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA). The variables studied were, monitoring and incentive. Data was collected from primary and secondary sources. The methodology employed was descriptive statistics, one sample z statistics. The result reveals that lack of incentive and monitoring has negative and statistically significant relationship with budget implementation. Based on this finding, the study concludes that, lack of incentives and monitoring adversely affects budget implementation. Suffice it to say that bureaucratic bottleneck impeded budget implementation. In view of the above conclusion, the study recommends that, there is need for the FCTA to provide incentives and motivation to staff in order to improve performance in; collection of revenues, budget preparation exercise and implementation and to guard against all sorts of behaviours. Also there is need for proper monitoring of budget, adequate provisions of relevant Votes of Charge should be provided so that expenditure will match budget request, good reporting system on the level of accomplishments need to be put in place and efficient mechanisms for project feedback and information required for project monitoring must be available.

Keywords: Monitoring, Incentives, Budget Implementation, FCTA, Nigeria

Introduction

The importance of monitoring and incentives on organizational performance efficiency particularly, the public sector, where the workers exhibit nonchalant attitude toward their primary and secondary responsibilities is an indispensable ingredient of effective governance, project management success and implementation. One of the key elements of government officials' responsibilities is an oversight on

management, operation, interpretation and implementation of government policies through a guiding principle of annual budgeting and planning. Therefore, budget implementation is the central issue or the manual that provides operational direction for all government activities in a country. In view of that, no government institution can successfully operate and implement planned budget without efficient monitoring of the process and the incentive that will bust the morale of the staff responsible for the job. Our problem of corruption today emanated from inefficient monitoring coupled with lack of incentives to entice the staff responsible. According to UNDP (2006) public sector has varieties of incentive that motivate employees to exert efforts in their primary responsibilities such as salaries, secondary benefits, intangible rewards, recognition or sanctions. These are mechanisms that are traditionally used to motivate employees to increase performance. They further state that the most impacting incentive globally are; good salaries and wages, pension scheme, health insurance, subsidies, gain sharing, transport, housing and clothing allowances, scholarship, sabbatical, conducive working environment, job security and safety, social amenities, career progression and opportunities, to mentioned but a few. However, they posit that, public service in many developing countries have weak incentives which resulted into overt and covert corruption such as late coming and absenteeism, brain drain and frictional unemployment, rent-seeking and low productivity, lack of; transparency, sincerity, accountability, honesty and job commitment.

Another important aspect that required monitoring and incentive in public service is process of revenue collection. Every public institution that has efficient and effective monitoring system of revenue collection and incentive, certainly, perform wonderfully in budget implementation more than the institution that does not have such mechanisms. But one important thing to be noted here is that, public sector has a very well organized system for monitoring budget implementation, for instance, the process of budget preparation down to implementation is a chain of activities designed to ensure effective monitoring, however budget implementation appeared to problematic across developing economies. To this effect, the study is aimed at identifying the implications of monitoring

and incentives on budget implementation. Considering the infrastructure those governments around the globe built in order to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of budget implementation is overwhelming, however, efficacy of the system is questionable. Furthermore, Government officials at all levels are being paid for the services they are rendering. Yet their commitment on their schedule of duty is not impressive worldwide. Based on these aforementioned problems the study ascribes for the following questions; what are factors that are affecting budget implementation? Why government officials are not committed to their job at all levels? In line with these research questions, the following research objective were set; to identify the factors that are affecting efficiency of budget implementation and to ascertain the reason why government officials are not committed to their job at all levels. It is our humble belief that, the findings of the study will provide concrete evidence on the implication of monitoring and incentives on budget implementation that will be useful public sectors budget and planning departments, academic institutions, policy makers and the economy at large. The paper is organized in the following subheadings; introduction, literature review and theoretical framework, methodology, result and discussion.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Principal agent theory's postulations, emphases the importance of project monitoring and incentives on the performance efficacy of employees' in both public and private institutions, according to Ross (1973), the incentive that a principal designed as compensation system, always motivates the management and employees to effectively act in line with his interest in general operations and budget implementation or project execution. This will motivate the agents to choose from the range of alternative possibilities, the most effective decision that will uplift the welfare and profitability of the both parties. However, before the agent chooses the action, the principal has to sets the pay-off rule that specifies the fees to be paid to the agent (Stiglitz, 1987 and Cave, 2003). Even though the amount of incentive's fee, always depends on the value judgment and the benefit that the principal will drive from the outcome of the performance of the agent (Arrow, 1984). In this regards, the Principal-

Agent relationship conflict can be minimised through incentives (Masu-Gombe and Alkali 2024). Empirical study of Paul and Robinson (2007) on Performance Budgeting, Motivation, and Incentives reveals that agency with higher levels of funding have high budget implementation, motivation and incentive while agencies with poor funding have less capacity of budget implementation, motivation and incentive. The study also finds that, Motivating agencies perform better when the full benefits of input control relaxation are being realized. Financial incentives play an important role in the behaviour of employees of public institutions of higher education (Douglas, Priest, Becker, Hossler, John (2002.).

Furthermore, the theory describes the relationship between the citizens as voters with executive government, the legislature with the executive, the government supervisors and subordinates (Mutuma, Ireri and Lyria (2016), Multan, 2000, Shi & Svenson, 2002; Lupia, 2001). This implies that, the executive and legislatives are the principals and subordinates are government workers (Masu-Gombe and Alkali 2024). To further buttress the relationship of theory with public sector, Forrester, (2002) argues that, in the field of public budgeting, relationships exist among those who provide agency services and those who allocate resources to service providers. The agents are those who make claims on governmental resources while the principals are those who allocate and ration the resources, Schick (1988) refers to them as claimants and conservers respectively. Arrow (1984) calls the two types of principal-agent problems, hidden action and hidden information. Due to these hidden factors, in the area of budgeting, moral hazard occurs when the agent hired by the principal changes his or her behaviour in a manner detrimental to the principal (Forrester, 2002). Hidden action in such a relationship involves the productive effort of the civil servants, possible perquisite consumption, or corruption (Leruth and Paul, 2007). Hidden information is when the agent has made some observation that the principal has not made and is important for the agent in making decisions, unfortunately, the principal cannot check. The theory posits that, decisions about revenues and expenditures depend on how information is processed and disclosed to the principal. If there are no effective mechanisms of control, two things

may happen in this situation, adverse selection and risk of moral hazards. Under adverse selection, the principal has either selected the wrong agent or he may define the agent's responsibility or agenda erroniously (Mbindyo 2010). Moral hazard occurs when the chosen agent changes his behaviour in such a way that is to the disadvantage of the principal. Government programs are also executed in a hierarchical manner through a chain of command as it is even in a single agency where there are superiors (supervisors) and subordinates. In most cases, the agents are the government agencies whereas the principal is the legislature in cases where the legislature determines the structure of budget (Masu-Gombe and Alkali 2024).

The theory argues that the agency problem arises because of conflicting interests and asymmetric information between the principal and the agent. The agent denies the principal having the right and timely information and absolute control on his actions (Pearce, 1992). So the only remedy in this situation is to build effective mechanisms for monitoring, so that the agent can act on his behalf efficiently (Black, 2003). In line with this assertion, Haka, (2007), Kazeem, Bwala and Dung (2019) argues that, the most commonly used mechanism for monitoring budget implementation and control is post-audit. This preposition is consistent with the findings of Pohlman, Santiago and Markel (1988) and Gitman and Vandenberg (2000) where they find that, firms are using post-audit to monitor and evaluate operating performance and the level of implementation of the existing projects. Similarly, Mukamwiza, Jean and Hakizimana (2021) examine the Role of Monitoring and Evaluation on effective project Implementation and find that, there is a positive correlation between monitoring and evaluation plan, strategy, process, resource allocation, budget plan, risk assessment plan and budget implement. Furthermore, Kizza, Ssendagire, Ekyagonza (2022) study Budget planning, monitoring, and organizational performance of non-profit health institutions in Uganda and find that, there is existence of a significant positive relationship between budget planning and organizational performance, budget monitoring, and organizational performance too.

In reflection to the above theoretical postulations and the empirical reviews is

pertinent the say that the application of the theory to this study apt and justified.

Methodology

The data of the study was obtained from primary and secondary sources. The primary source of data for the study was obtained through surveys conducted by administering questionnaires to relevant officers of some FCTA Secretariats, Departments and Agencies (SDAs). The population of the study is composed of 223 budget officers. The research used a random sampling technique. The researcher employed Descriptive Statistics by one Sample Z test using XLSTAT.

Empirical Model

The method of estimation of primary data was based on Methods of Moments as stated by Koutsoyiannis (2001). For the analysis of data, the following formula was used:
Let the likert scale X be represented by 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and; the responses for each variable, that is, the sample frequencies recorded as f1, f2, f3, f4 and f5 presented in a tabular form as:

Frequency Distribution of Responses of Observations on Challenges of Budget Implementation

X	F	Fx	$X-\bar{X}$	$(X-\bar{X})^2$	$f(X-\bar{X})^2$
1	f_1	f_1	$1-\bar{X}$	$(1-\bar{X})^2$	$f_1(1-\bar{X})^2$
2	f_2	$2f_2$	$2-\bar{X}$	$(2-\bar{X})^2$	$f_2(2-\bar{X})^2$
3	f_3	$3f_3$	$3-\bar{X}$	$(3-\bar{X})^2$	$f_3(3-\bar{X})^2$
4	f_4	$4f_4$	$4-\bar{X}$	$(4-\bar{X})^2$	$f_4(4-\bar{X})^2$
5	f_5	$5f_5$	$5-\bar{X}$	$(5-\bar{X})^2$	$f_5(5-\bar{X})^2$
	$\sum f=$ $f_1+f_2+\ldots+f_5$	$\sum fX=$ $f_1+2f_2+\ldots+5f_5$	$\sum X-\bar{X})$	$\sum(X-\bar{X})^2$	$\sum f(X-\bar{X})^2$

Then,
Find each column total
ii. Estimate mean $\bar{X} = \sum fX/\sum f = \sum fX/n$ …… (1)
iii. Estimate standard deviation
$s = \sqrt{\sum f(X-\bar{X})^2/\sum f-1}$ …….. (2)
iv. Estimate variance

$s^2 = (\sqrt{\sum f(X-\bar{X})^2/\sum f-1)^2}$…….. (3)

The mean of the sample is an unbiased estimate of the population mean

$E(\bar{X}) = \mu$

Compute the value of the test statistic (z) for large samples where the sample size is 30 or more.

Going by Salvatore & Reagle (2002), Stephens (2009) and Agresti & Klingenberg (2018),

$z = \bar{X} - \mu 0/\sigma\bar{X}$…… (4)

Where $\bar{X}$ is the mean of the sample

$\mu 0$ is population mean as given in the null hypothesis

Population standard deviation $\sigma\bar{X}$is computed by dividing σ by $\sqrt{n}$

If the population standard deviation σ is unknown, it is estimated by using the sample standard deviation s.

Equation (4) can now be compared with the theoretical (tabular) value of z at the 5 percent level of significance which can be read from the table.

Hypothesis

i. H_0: There is no significant relationship between monitoring and budget implementation in FCTA.
ii. H_0: There is no significant relationship between incentives and budget implementation in FCTA.

The criteria are that if:
$z^* > z$ = REJECT Hypothesis
$z^* < z$ = ACCEPT Hypothesis
Where z^* = computed z statistic
z = theoretical/tabular value of z

Result Interpretation and Discussion

Table 1: Distribution of descriptive result on effect of monitoring on budget implementation.

(One-sample z-test / Two-tailed test)(Q2MTR)95% confidence interval on the mean:

[3.266,	3.758]
Difference	0.512
z (Observed value)	4.084
|z| (Critical value)	1.960
p-value (Two-tailed)	<0.0001
Alpha	0.05

Source: Author's Computation (2022) XLSTAT package

Test interpretation:

H0: The mean is equal to 3 (there is no significant relationship between lack of monitoring and budget implementation)

H1: The mean is different from 3 (there is significant relationship between lack of monitoring and budget implementation)

As the computed p-value is lower than the significance level alpha=0.05, one should reject the null hypothesis H0, and accept the alternative hypothesis H1.

$z^* = 4.084$ …… (9)

Since the theoretical (tabular) value of z at the 5 percent level of significance is 1.96

$z^* > z$

$4.084 > 1.96$

We reject that the true value of the population mean $\mu=3$ which reveals that there is significant relationship between lack of monitoring and budget implementation in FCTA. We reject the null hypothesis.

We are 95% confident that the mean response is between 3.266 and 3.758. The inferential statistics result ($z^*= 4.084 > z=1.96$, p-value < 0.0001) shows a significant effect of lack of monitoring on budget implementation. The result of the study finds support in the findings ($t^* = 3.497 > t = 1.699$) of Kazeem, Bwala and Dung (2019) that lack of monitoring has a significant effect on budget implementation. Pearce (1992) states that since the agent is acting on behalf of the principal, the Principal-Agent problem arises. The result is not consistent with the findings ($t^* = 0.236140$, p-value =0.8136) of Effiom and Edet (2019) that has a negative but insignificant effect on capital budget implementation. It is worthy to mention that monitoring of the actual expenditures against revenue and appropriation is one aspect of the budget execution phase of the budget process (Omopariola, 2003). Smith noted the practice of preparing an Annual Budget Implementation Report by Federal Ministry of Finance which started in 2006.

The descriptive statistics result reveals that the next challenge which follows that affect budget implementation is lack of incentives (mean = 3.8659, SD = 0.88558, variance = 0.784). This is in line with the findings of Mbindyo (2010) that 13.2% strongly agree and 36.8% agree that lack of staff motivation is a challenge to budget implementation.

Descriptive statistics reveals lack of monitoring (mean = 3.5122, SD = 1.13577) as the next challenge that follows. This

agrees with the findings of Feese (2016) that lack of effective budget monitoring and evaluation was one of the reasons behind the average of 50% capital budget performance since 1999 and it contradicts the findings of Mbindyo (2010) that 36% disagreed as to this factor. The Descriptive statistics result shows that they neither agreed nor disagreed to inadequate executive capacity as a challenge.

Table 2: Distribution of descriptive result on incentives in budget implementation. (One-sample z-test / Two-tailed test)(Q3ICV)

95% confidence interval on the mean:	
[3.674,	4.058]
Difference	0.866
z (Observed value)	8.854
|z| (Critical value)	1.960
p-value (Two-tailed)	<0.0001
Alpha	0.05

Source: Author's Computation (2022) XLSTAT package

Test interpretation:

H0: The mean is equal to 3 (there is no significant relationship between lack of incentives and budget implementation)

H1: The mean is different from 3 (there is significant relationship between lack of incentives and budget implementation)

As the computed p-value is lower than the significance level alpha=0.05, one should reject the null hypothesis H0, and accept the alternative hypothesis H1.

$z^* = 8.854$ ……(10)

Since the theoretical (tabular) value of z at the 5 percent level of significance is 1.96

$z^* > z$

$8.854 > 1.96$

We reject that the true value of the population mean $\mu=3$ which reveals that there is significant relationship between lack of incentives and budget implementation in FCTA. We reject the null hypothesis.

We are 95% confident that the mean response is between 3.674 and 4.058.

The inferential statistics result ($z^* = 8.854 > 1.96$, p-value = <0.0001) shows significant relationship between lack of incentive and budget implementation. The result lend support to the finding of Mbindyo (2010) that lack of staff motivation is a major common challenge but the inferential

statistics (F* = 0.815, p-value =0.526) reveals no significant difference between the duration the respondents served in the council and lack of motivation. The place of incentive can be traced to the Principal-Agent Theory in which Stiglitz (1987) argued that the major emphasis of the literature is how a principal can design a compensating system that can motivate the agent to act on the principal's behalf so as to serve the principal's interest. Arrow (1984), argued that the principal sets up the pay-off rules that specifies the fee to be paid to the agent and the fee depends on the observation the principal makes on the result of the action. In this connection, Cave (2003) explained that workers can shirk and managers can place their own interests above those of the owners of the company. Black (2003) states that the problem is how the principal can motivate the agent to act on his behalf and not follow his own self-interest

Discussion of Result

The inferential statistics result (z* = 8.854 > 1.96, p-value = <0.0001) shows significant relationship between lack of incentive and budget implementation. The result lend support to the finding of Mbindyo (2010) that lack of staff motivation is a major common challenge but the inferential statistics (F* = 0.815, p-value =0.526) reveals no significant difference between the duration the respondents served in the council and lack of motivation. The place of incentive can be traced to the Principal-Agent Theory in which Stiglitz (1987) argued that the major emphasis of the literature is how a principal can design a compensating system that can motivate the agent to act on the principal's behalf so as to serve the principal's interest. Arrow (1984), argued that the principal sets up the pay-off rules that specifies the fee to be paid to the agent and the fee depends on the observation the principal makes on the result of the action. In this connection, Cave (2003) explained that workers can shirk and managers can place their own interests above those of the owners of the company. Black (2003) states that the problem is how the principal can motivate the agent to act on his behalf and not follow his own self-interest.

The inferential statistics result (z*= 4.084 > z=1.96, p-value < 0.0001) shows a significant effect of lack of monitoring on budget implementation. The result of the

study finds support in the findings (t* = 3.497 > t = 1.699) of Kazeem, Bwala and Dung (2019) that lack of monitoring has a significant effect on budget implementation. Pearce (1992) states that since the agent is acting on behalf of the principal, the Principal-Agent problem arises. The result is not consistent with the findings (t* = 0.236140, p-value =0.8136) of Effiom and Edet (2019) that has a negative but insignificant effect on capital budget implementation. It is worthy to mention that monitoring of the actual expenditures against revenue and appropriation is one aspect of the budget execution phase of the budget process (Omopariola, 2003). Smith noted the practice of preparing an Annual Budget Implementation Report by Federal Ministry of Finance which started in 2006.

Conclusion

Based on the above findings, the researcher arrived at the conclusion that, lack of incentives and monitoring adversely affects budget implementation. Suffice it to say that bureaucratic bottleneck impeded budget implementation.

Recommendations

In view of the above findings and conclusion, the researcher is advancing the following recommendations:

1. There is need for the FCTA to provide incentives and motivation to staff in order to improve performance, collection of revenues, enhance the budget preparation exercise and implementation and to guard against all sorts of behaviours.
2. FCTA need a proper monitoring of budget, adequate provisions of relevant Votes of Charge should be made so that expenditure will match budget request with the correct Votes of Charge, as well as to have a good reporting system on the level of accomplishments.
3. FCTA should key in into the Eye mark project by feeding information required for project monitoring.

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